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Abstract 
Following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, Norway’s banking system 
experienced a significant liquidity squeeze. Norwegian banks had relied extensively on 
short-term funding from foreign funding markets and as the financial crisis evolved, 
foreign funding dried up. To alleviate pressure, Norwegian authorities responded with a 
number of emergency programs. In early 2009, the government created the State Finance 
Fund (SFF) to recapitalize banks. The SFF was capitalized with a NOK 50 billion ($7.07 
billion) equity investment from the Finance Ministry. In total, 34 banks applied for capital 
injections totaling NOK 6.7 billion. By the end of 2009, six banks had withdrawn their 
applications. The SFF injected a total of NOK 4.1 billion in 28 banks, most of them savings 
banks. Capital raising efforts both from private markets and from the State Finance Fund 
significantly improved Norway’s banking system. By December 2009, the central bank’s 
Financial Stability Report indicated that even in a high-stress scenario, bank Tier 1 capital 
ratios would remain above the regulatory minimum for the next three years.   
Keywords: broad-based, broad-based capital injections, capital injections, Global Financial 
Crisis, Norway, Norwegian State Finance Fund 
  
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based capital injection programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
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At a Glance  
Following the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy in September 2008, 
Norway’s banking system experienced a 
significant liquidity squeeze (IMF 2010). 
Norwegian banks had relied extensively 
on short-term funding from foreign 
funding markets and as the financial 
crisis evolved, foreign funding dried up 
(IMF 2010). Credit ratings of Norway’s 
largest banks deteriorated, the ratio of 
nonperforming to gross loans rose, and 
profitability decreased during the crisis 
(see Figure 1) (IMF 2010). 
To alleviate pressure, Norwegian 
authorities responded by providing 
liquidity in currency markets and 
creating a covered bond swap program 
(IMF 2010).  The Norges Bank, Norway’s 
central bank, also eased collateral 
requirements for banks using its liquidity 
facilities in October 2008 (IMF 2010).  
In early 2009, the Norwegian 
government (the State) created the State 
Finance Fund (SFF) to recapitalize banks 
(IMF 2010). The SFF was capitalized with 
a NOK 50 billion equity investment from 
the Finance Ministry (Mayer Brown 
2009). In total, 34 banks applied for 
capital injections totaling NOK 6.7 billion (IMF 2010). By the end of 2009, six banks had 
withdrawn their applications, as they were able to raise private capital (SFF 2009a). The 
SFF injected a total of NOK 4.1 billion into 28 banks, all but one of which were savings 
banks (State Finance Fund 2012). 
  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: to provide temporary core capital to 
Norwegian banks to strengthen the banks and enable 
them to better maintain normal lending activities 
(Ministry of Finance 2009c). 
Announcement date   February 8, 2009 
Operational date March 6, 2009 
Sunset date June 30, 2014 
Voluntary vs. involuntary Voluntary 
Program size NOK 50 billion  
($7.01 billion) 
Peak usage  NOK 4.1 billion 
Capital characteristics  Two options: fund bonds 
and preference capital 
Outcomes Improved Tier 1 capital 
adequacy in both 
participating and non-
participating banks; 
improved lending ability  
Key features Participation encouraged 
by minimum capital 
regulatory requirements  
Norwegian State Finance Fund (GFC) 
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Source: IMF 2010. 
Summary Evaluation 
Capital raising efforts both from private markets and from the State Finance Fund 
significantly improved Norway’s banking system (IMF 2010). By December 2009, the 
central bank’s Financial Stability Report indicated that even in a high-stress scenario, bank 
Tier 1 capital ratios would remain above the regulatory minimum for the next three years 
(IMF 2010).   
Banks that received a capital injection from the SFF elevated lending rates in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis when compared to other banks (SFF 2009a). According to the SFF’s 
annual reports, the fund effectively reduced uncertainty in capital markets; fund bond 
premiums peaked in 2009 at 7 percent above NIBOR but had declined to 5 percent above 
NIBOR by the end of 2009 (SFF 2009b). 
Figure 1: Credit Ratings, Lending Quality, and Profitability of Norwegian Banks: 2003–2008 
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By the end of 2009, surveyed banks indicated that credit conditions had eased (SFF 2009a). 
Quarterly surveys conducted by Norges Bank of credit practices of a selection of the largest 
banks in Norway found that banks had eased credit practices in the third and fourth 
quarters of 2009 and that capital adequacy was highly correlated with easy credit practices 
(SFF 2014). 
The SFF’s final annual report, issued in 2014, concluded that it had strengthened financial 
stability by:  
• Increasing Tier 1 capital adequacy in participating banks; 
• Making it easier and cheaper to raise core capital in the markets for banks that 
did not use the State Finance Fund; 
• Strengthening Tier 1 capital, making other deposit and loan financing cheaper; 
• Improving lending ability to companies and households (SFF 2014). 
In 2014, the SFF had an operating budget of NOK 3 million (Parliament of Norway 2015). 
Total operating costs were NOK 1.6 million, resulting in a NOK 1.4 million profit at the close 
of the accounts, as well as NOK 1.7 million in earned equity (Parliament of Norway 2015).   
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Norway Context 2008 - 2009 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$469.39 billion in 2008 
$388.85 billion 2009 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$96,944 in 2008 
$79,978 in 2009 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt) 
As of Q4 2008:  
Fitch: AAA 
Moody’s: Aaa 
S&P: AAA 
 
As of Q4 2009:  
Fitch: AAA 
Moody’s: Aaa 
S&P: AAA 
Size of banking system 
$496.76 billion in 2008 
$485.83 billion in 2009 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP 
105.83% in 2008 
124.94% in 2009 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
85.62% in 2008 
82.36% in 2009 
5-bank concentration of banking system 
98.84% in 2008 
96.44% in 2009 
Foreign involvement in banking system 16% foreign owned in 2008/2009 
Government ownership of banking system 33% state owned in 2008/2009 
Existence of deposit insurance Yes 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset. 
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Key Design Decisions  
1. Purpose/Part of package: The SFF was announced alongside another 
government fund, the State Bond Fund. 
On February 8, 2009, the Norwegian government announced two emergency fund facilities: 
the State Finance Fund and the State Bond Fund (IMF 2010). The Finance Ministry 
capitalized each fund with NOK 50 billion (Mayer Brown 2009).  
The State Bond Fund was intended to provide temporary core capital to Norwegian banks 
to strengthen the banks and enable the banks to better maintain normal lending activities 
(Ministry of Finance 2009c). 
1. Legal authority: Regulations pertaining to the SFF were passed into law on March 
6, 2009, through the State Finance Fund Act. 
The government passed legal regulations pertaining to the SFF on March 6, 2009, through 
the Act on the State Finance Fund (Ministry of Finance 2009a). The government passed 
subsequent regulations specifying the SFF’s operations and responsibilities on May 8, 2009 
(SFF 2009a). The SFF was also subject to the Securities Trading Act and the Public 
Procurement Act (SFF 2009a).  
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority approved the SFF 
program in March 2009, as required by the Agreement on the European Economic Area 
(EEA) (EFTA Surveillance Authority 2009). Norway is not a member of the European Union 
(EU) but is part of the EEA and EFTA. The European Commission reviews actions by EU 
member governments, such as bank recapitalizations, that could have anti-competitive 
effects. The EFTA Surveillance Authority makes such determinations for non-EU EFTA 
members.   
2. Communication: The government announced the SFF on February 8, 2009, along 
with the State Bond Fund, and the SFF released annual reports. 
The government announced the SFF on February 8, 2009, along with the State Bond Fund 
(Mayer Brown 2009). The SFF released annual reports between 2009 and 2014.  
3. Governance/Administration: The SFF was a separate legal entity under the 
purview of the Ministry of Finance. The SFF Board consisted of three members, 
appointed by the King. 
The SFF was established as a separate legal entity under the purview of the Ministry of 
Finance (Ministry of Finance 2009a). 
The SFF was administered by a board comprising three members (Ministry of Finance 
2009a). The King appointed the members, including a chairman and deputy chairman 
(Ministry of Finance 2009a).  
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The Ministry of Finance appointed an external auditor to audit the SFF every year. In 2009 
the appointed auditor was Deloitte (SFF 2009a). From 2010 until liquidation, the appointed 
auditor was Ernst & Young (SFF 2014). 
4. Size: The State allocated NOK 50 billion to the SFF. In total, NOK 4.1 billion was 
injected into 28 banks. 
The State allocated NOK 50 billion to the SFF for capital injections (IMF 2010). In total, 34 
banks applied for a total of NOK 6.7 billion from the fund (IMF 2010). The deadline to apply 
was September 30, 2009 (IMF 2010). The first round of capital was injected on September 
30, 2009, and the last on December 17, 2009 (SFF 2014). 
By the end of 2009, 28 banks whose assets represented 14 percent of Norway’s total 
banking assets had received NOK 4.1 billion from the SFF (SFF 2012). Of the banks that 
applied, 18 had capital adequacy of greater than 12 percent (SFF 2012).  
Six banks withdrew their applications by the end of 2009 as they had been able to raise 
private capital (State Finance Fund 2009a). 
5. Eligible institutions: Norwegian banks and foreign-owned banks operating in 
Norway that were “fundamentally sound” could receive capital injections.  
Only Norwegian banks and foreign-owned bank subsidiaries (though not foreign-owned 
bank branches) operating in Norway were eligible to apply for the SFF program (SFF 
2009b). Additionally, in compliance with EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) rules, the SFF 
could lend only to banks that the Norwegian bank supervisory authority determined were 
“fundamentally sound” based on capital adequacy ratios, asset quality, and other measures 
(SFF 2009a). SFF analysis to determine soundness took “into account probable 
development in the near future” and therefore factored in capital raising efforts (SFF 
2009a). While participation in the program was voluntary, banks faced an 8 percent capital 
adequacy requirement and a 4 percent Tier 1 capital requirement which likely motivated 
banks to apply (IMF 2010). 
In total, 34 banks applied for the capital injection program (IMF 2010). The deadline to 
apply was September 30, 2009 (Ministry of Finance 2009c). Nearly all of the applications 
were submitted in the last half of September 2009, likely for a few reasons (SFF 2014). 
First, many banks waited for second-quarter figures to add to their applications (SFF 
2014). Second, banks waited to see whether other banks would apply (SFF 2014). Third, 
banks waited as capital markets improved in spring and summer 2009 to see if private 
capital fundraising could replace the SFF (SFF 2014).  
Banks were required to submit applications including:  
• Favored capital instrument; 
• Size of the desired capital investment; 
• Annual account, annual report, and auditor’s report for 2008; 
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• Adopted budget for 2009; 
• Internal risk and capital assessment; 
• Forecast for meeting solvency requirement (Ministry of Finance 2009c). 
In reviewing applications, the SFF prioritized banks that were “important for financial 
stability” (Ministry of Finance 2009c). Ultimately, however, the SFF did not reject any 
applications.  
Most of the banks that applied were savings banks (SFF 2009a). The savings banks that 
applied to the SFF constituted 50% of the total assets of Norwegian savings banks (SFF 
2009a). All but one of the 28 banks that received capital were savings banks. 
Figure 2:  Total SFF Injected Capital 
 
Source: IMF 2010. 
Bank Total capital injected 
(KOR) 
Bank Total capital 
injected (KOR) 
Sparebanken Vest 960 million Kvinesdal Sparebank 31.5 million 
Sparebanken 1 SMN 
450 million 
Hjelmeland 
Sparebank 30.5 million 
Sandnes Sparebank 450 million Selbu Sparebank 28 million 
Sparebanken Sør 400 million Tinn Sparebank 25 million 
Sparebank 1 Buskerud-
Vestfold 200 million 
Ørland Sparebank 
24 million 
Totens Sparebank 132 million Hol Sparebank 25 million 
Klepp Sparebank 
75 million 
Bud, Fræna og Hustad 
Sparebank 25 million 
Aurskog Sparebank 60 million Blaker Sparebank 20 million 
Lillestrøm Sparebank 60 million Grong Sparebank 22 million 
Nes Prestegjelds 
Sparebank 96.8 million 
Seljord Sparebank 
20 million 
Holla og Lunde 
Sparebank 41 million 
Verdibanken ASA 
15 million 
Rørosbanken Røros 
Sparebank 40 million 
Gjerstad Sparebank 
18 million 
Indre Sogn Sparebank 33 million Soknedal Sparebank 13 million 
Bamble og Langesund 
Sparebank 30 million 
Vegårshei Sparebank 
9 million 
Soknedal Sparebank 13 million   
Vegårshei Sparebank 9 million   
Total capital injected   4.134 billion 
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6. Individual participation limits: Banks faced individual participation limits 
capped by Tier 1 capital ratios. 
The SFF recapitalized banks only up to a designated Tier 1 capital ratio. Banks with Tier 1 
capital adequacy below 7 percent could be recapitalized up to 10 percent. Banks with Tier 
1 capital ratios above 7 percent could be recapitalized by up to 3 percentage points 
(Ministry of Finance 2009c). The SFF required any bank to provide additional 
documentation if it sought an injection that constituted more than a 2-percentage point 
increase in its total Tier 1 capital ratio or if the injection would raise its Tier 1 capital ratio 
above 12 percent (Ministry of Finance 2009c).  
7. Capital characteristics: The SFF injected capital in two forms: fund bonds and 
preference capital. 
The SFF’s capital instruments came in two forms: fund bonds and preference capital (SFF 
2012). Both instruments counted as Tier 1 capital but had no voting rights (SFF 2009a). 
Preference capital was close in design to shares or equity certificates (SFF 2009b). Both 
instruments required interest payment from the bank based on issuer risk (SFF 2009b). 
Fund bonds were more flexible and could be redeemed by the bank with only one month’s 
notice, while preference capital had to be held for three years (SFF 2014). Last, preference 
capital was designed with a call option to convert to ordinary shares in five years if not 
redeemed (SFF 2009b). 
Write-downs on SFF bonds to cover income statements in annual accounts could take place 
only after write-downs of: contributed share capital, paid-in primary capital certificate 
capital, primary capital in savings banks, and preference capital used for the injection of 
Tier 1 capital from the SFF (SFF 2009b). The fund bonds thus took priority over all existing 
capital and newly injected preferred shares under the SFF. Banks were mandated to write 
down bonds should their Tier 1 capital adequacy ratios fall below 5 percent or their capital 
adequacy fall below 8 percent (SFF 2009a). 
Banks mainly applied for fund bonds (SFF 2009a). One bank applied for preference capital 
totaling NOK 27 million (SFF 2009a).  
8. Dividend/interest: The interest rate was calculated as a fixed markup (based on 
risk class) over six-month or five-year fixed-term Norwegian government 
securities interest rates. 
The SFF claimed a preferential right to a non-cumulative claim on annual interest 
payments, provided capital adequacy was 0.2% over the capital adequacy requirements. 
The interest rate was calculated as a fixed markup (based on risk class) over six-month or 
five-year fixed-term Norwegian government securities interest rates. (Ministry of Finance 
2009c). 
The markup was identified by first classifying banks in risk classes based on credit ratings 
from “an approved credit rating company,” with corresponding markups. See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3:  Interest Rate Markups Based on Risk Classes for Fund Bonds and 
Preference Capital  
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 2009c. 
 
All banks chose a floating interest rate linked to the six-month treasury interest rate plus 
the risk class markup (SFF 2009a). Of the 28 banks that received capital from the SFF, three 
banks were placed in risk class 2, and 25 banks were placed in risk class 3 (SFF 2009a). 
The interest was to be paid as long as banks’ profits were sufficient to cover the interest 
payment (SFF 2009b). To incentivize banks to redeem their fund bonds, interest rates 
increased by 1 percentage point four years after the issuance of the bonds and a further 1 
percentage point five years after issuance (SFF 2009a). Both mutual fund bonds and the 
preference capital instrument were perpetuities, with no maturity (SFF 2009a) 
9. Allocation of losses for existing stakeholders: Research did not reveal any 
information on this. 
Research did not reveal any information on this.  
10. Debt restructuring plan: Research did not reveal any information on this.  
Research did not reveal any information on this.  
11. Fate of existing board and management: Research did not reveal any information 
on this.  
Research did not reveal any information on this.  
12. Other conditions: Participation in the SFF came with restrictions on senior 
executive salaries and bonuses, dividend payments, and utilization of capital 
injected. 
The State imposed restrictions on senior executive salaries and bonuses (Ministry of 
Finance 2009b). Through December 31, 2010, benefits and salaries for senior executives 
could not be increased (Ministry of Finance 2009b). Senior executives with a fixed salary 
Risk class Credit rating Markup for fund bond Markup for preference capital 
1 AA- or better  5.0 percentage points 6.0 percentage points 
2 From A- to A+ 5.5 percentage points 6.5 percentage points 
3 BBB+ or lower  6.0 percentage points 7.0 percentage points 
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exceeding NOK 1.5 million could not receive bonuses in 2009 and 2010 (Ministry of 
Finance 2009b). The state also prevented senior executives from receiving shares or new 
stock option programs (Ministry of Finance 2009b). Banks could not extend or renew stock 
option programs (Ministry of Finance 2009b). Banks could also not pay out bonuses earned 
in 2009 and 2010 in later years (Ministry of Finance 2009b). 
The SFF also entered into agreements with each bank stipulating restrictions on dividend 
payments and distributions. Dividends could not exceed 50% of a bank’s unrestricted 
equity. (Ministry of Finance 2009c).  
Regulations also stipulated that the banks had to use the capital injection “in accordance 
with the purpose of the scheme . . . and that the bank [could] not utilize the capital injection 
in its marketing or to implement aggressive commercial strategies” (Ministry of Finance 
2009c). Moreover, any participating bank was not to, without prior consent of the SFF: 
make significant investments in affiliates, engage in merger or demerger, or make 
significant group contributions to a company in the same group as the bank except for 
dividends on ordinary shares (SFF 2009b). 
13.  Exit strategy: The King of Norway was to decide when SFF would be wound 
down. 
The King of Norway was empowered to decide when the SFF would be wound down. By 
royal decree on February 14, 2014, the fund was to be terminated that year; it was 
ultimately terminated on June 30, 2014, with only a liquidation board remaining (SFF 
2014). 
Two banks redeemed fund bonds in 2010. In 2011, seven banks indicated in SFF surveys 
that they planned to redeem fund bonds in the second half of 2011. Two did so by August 1, 
replacing SFF bonds with capital raised in the markets. However, turmoil in markets in the 
latter half of 2011 caused the other five banks to reverse their plans. Three banks 
redeemed deposits in 2012, and 14 banks redeemed deposits in 2013. By 2014, only one 
bank, Lillestrøm Sparebank, had yet to redeem its deposits (totaling KOR 60 million), 
though it applied to redeem its deposit by 2014 (SFF 2014).  
14. Amendments to relevant regulations: Research did not reveal any information 
on this.  
Research did not reveal any information on this.  
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